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Abstract 
When exogenously imposed, rank-order tournaments have incentive properties but their 
overall efficiency is reduced by a high variance in performance (Bull, Schotter, and Weigelt 
1987).  However, since the efficiency of performance-related pay is attributable both to its 
incentive effect and to its selection effect among employees (Lazear, 2000), it is important to 
investigate the ex ante sorting effect of tournaments. This paper reports results from an 
experiment analyzing whether allowing subjects to self-select into different payment schemes 
helps in reducing the variability of performance in tournaments. We show that when the 
subjects choose to enter a tournament, the average effort is higher and the between-subject 
variance is substantially lower than when the same payment scheme is imposed. Mainly based 
on the degree of risk aversion, sorting is efficiency-enhancing since it increases the 
homogeneity of the contestants. We suggest that the flexibility of the labor market is an 
important condition for a higher efficiency of relative performance pay. 
 
 
Résumé 
Lorsqu'ils sont imposés de manière exogène, les tournois possèdent des propriétés incitatives 
importantes mais leur efficacité globale est réduite par le niveau élevé de la variance de la 
performance des individus (Bull, Schotter et Weigelt 1987). Toutefois, dans la mesure où 
l'efficacité de la rémunération à la performance peut être attribuée à la fois à un effet 
d'incitation et à un effet de sélection parmi les salariés (Lazear 2000), il est important 
d'analyser l'effet de sélection ex ante des tournois.  Cet article relate une expérience destinée à 
tester si la possibilité donnée aux sujets de choisir entre différents modes de rémunération 
permet de réduire la variance de la performance en tournois. Nous montrons que lorsque les 
sujets choisissent d'entrer en compétition, l'effort moyen est plus élevé et la variance inter-
individuelle est substantiellement réduite par rapport à un traitement où le même mode de 
rémunération est imposé. L'auto-sélection, fondée en grande partie sur le degré d'aversion au 
risque, améliore l'efficience car elle accroît l'homogénéité des compétiteurs. Ceci suggère que 
la flexibilité du marché du travail est une condition importante pour l'accroissement de 
l'efficience de la rémunération à la performance. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The use of promotion tournaments is fairly widespread especially in the higher ranks of firms 
and organizations. The incentive property of tournaments has been studied extensively in the 
theoretical literature (Lazear and Rosen 1981; Green and Stokey 1983; Nalebuff and Stiglitz 
1983; O'Keeffe, Viscusi, and Zeckhauser 1984; for a survey see McLaughlin 1988). The 
empirical studies, based on survey or experimental data, are fewer and many survey analyses 
use sports rather than business data (Prendergast 1999). These studies have confirmed that the 
tournament efficiency depends on the spread between the winner’s and the loser’s prizes, the 
number of prizes at stake, the size of the tournament, and the degree of uncertainty faced by 
the employees.
1
  
However, both theoretical models and empirical studies also point to some factors that limit 
the incentive effect of tournaments, such as collusion among employees or even  sabotage (see 
Lazear 1989 for a theoretical analysis and Harbring and Irlenbusch 2004 for some 
experimental evidence). More generally, most laboratory experiments have provided evidence 
of tournaments being associated with a high variance in effort (see in particular Bull, Schotter, 
and Weigelt 1987 and Harbring and Irlenbusch 2003; van Dijk, Sonnemans, and van Winden 
2001). This variance of effort, which is found to be larger in tournaments than in an equivalent 
piece-rate scheme, reduces the overall efficiency of tournaments. 
The principal aim of this paper is to show that previous experimental evidence regarding the 
variability of effort in tournaments is misleading because the experiments have not accounted 
for sorting, that is, that agents typically choose to participate in a tournament. The large 
                                                 
1 Studies based on survey data include Bognanno  (2001),  Ehrenberg and Bognanno (1990b), Eriksson (1999), 
Knoeber and Thurman (1994), Main, O'Reilly III, and Wade (1993).  Studies based on experimental evidence 
include Bull, Schotter, and Weigelt (1987), Harbring and Irlenbusch (2003), Nalbantian and Schotter (1997), 
Orrison, Schotter, and Weigelt (2004), Schotter and Weigelt (1992). 
 3
variability observed in earlier studies is usually explained by the game nature of the 
tournament, which requires the agents to elaborate a strategy that is more cognitively 
demanding than the maximizing behavior required by a piece-rate system (Bull, Schotter, and 
Weigelt 1987). Indeed, in addition to the stochastic technology of production, the agents have 
to cope with strategic uncertainty.
2
 The use of high-variance strategies may also be related to 
both the difficulty of the task and the ability of the individuals (Vandegrift and Brown 2003). 
The hypothesis that we test in this paper is that the variability of effort may be reduced – and 
thus the efficiency of tournament increased - by allowing people to choose their payment 
scheme, i.e. allowing them to enter or not the competition. More precisely, we suggest that the 
observed high variance of effort may be due to the fact that in previous experiments very risk 
averse or under-confident subjects are imposed such a competitive payment scheme.  For 
example, facing these two sources of uncertainty, some of these subjects “drop-out”, i.e. 
choose the minimum effort, securing the loser’s prize without bearing any cost of effort, 
whereas others choose the maximum effort, securing the winner’s prize but with an 
inefficiently high cost of effort. Had the subjects been given the choice, like in flexible labor 
markets where people can choose to enter or shy away from competitive occupations, very 
risk averse subjects would probably not have entered the competition and the overall variance 
of effort would be lower. 
By testing whether the performance variability is reduced by the ex ante sorting effect of 
tournaments, our paper contributes to a very recent literature about the importance of both 
incentive and sorting effects in the determination of payment schemes’ efficiency, initiated by 
                                                 
2  The variance of effort is diminished when the subjects play against an automaton choosing the same common 
knowledge effort level repeatedly, but not when more information is given about the past effort of a human 
competitor. The observed variance can thus be related to the strategic nature of the game. 
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Lazear (2000).
3
 This literature shows that sorting influences economic behavior.  Earlier, the 
sorting function of tournaments has mainly been documented with respect to their ability to 
select ex post the best performers. However, their ex ante sorting effect is considerably less 
studied and none of the previous empirical studies have been concerned with the impact of ex 
ante sorting on the variability of performance.
4
  
To study the ex ante sorting effect of tournaments and its impact on the variability of effort, 
we have designed a laboratory experiment based on the comparison between a Benchmark 
Treatment and a Choice Treatment, and involving 120 student-subjects. In the Benchmark 
Treatment, half of the subjects are paid according to a piece-rate payment scheme and the 
other half enters pair-wise tournaments. This treatment consists of a one-stage game in which 
the subjects choose their level of effort knowing their payment scheme and the uncertainty of 
the environment. We find, in line with earlier experiments, that in this treatment, the variance 
of effort is substantially higher in the tournament than in the piece-rate payment scheme. In 
the Choice Treatment, we add a preliminary stage in which the subjects choose between a 
piece-rate scheme and a tournament. Those who choose the tournament are paired together.  In 
the second stage, each subject decides on his level of effort. In both treatments, the individual 
outcome depends on both the effort level and an i.i.d. random shock. The difference between 
                                                 
3 In the Safelite study (Lazear, 2000), half of the productivity gain associated with the introduction of  variable 
pay is attributed to its ability to sort the most skilled employees.  Experimental tests include Cadsby, Song, and 
Tapon  (2004), and Eriksson and Villeval  (2004), on sorting and incentives; Lazear, Malmendier, and Weber  
(2005) on sorting and social preferences; Bohnet and Kübler  (2004) on sorting and cooperation. 
4 In the theoretical literature, Fullerton and McAfee  (1999) propose an auction design in order to limit the entry 
into tournaments to selected highly qualified contestants. Hvide and Kristiansen  (2003) show, however, that the 
selection efficiency of tournaments is not necessarily increased by improving the quality of the contestant pool.  
In the empirical literature, Ehrenberg and Bognanno  (1990a) show that higher winners’ prizes attract better 
players and Knoeber and Thurman  (1994) propose setting minimum standards to get rid of the poor performing 
competitors. Niederle and Vesterlund  (2005) and Datta Gupta, Poulsen, and Villeval  (2005) identify the 
importance of gender in the ex ante sorting effect of tournaments. Fershtman and Gneezy  (2004) introduce a 
possibility of quitting in a dynamic tournament with asymmetric players. Bonin, Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, and 
Sunde (2006) use survey data and show that risk averse individuals are more likely to be sorted into occupations 
with low earnings risk, and Dohmen and Falk (2005) observe that risk averse subjects prefer fixed payments over 
piece-rate or tournament schemes. 
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the two payment schemes emanates from the strategic uncertainty associated with the 
tournament setting.  
By comparing the subjects’ behavior in the two treatments, we can identify  the impact of 
sorting on the average and the variance of effort. We also seek to identify determinants of self-
selection. The equilibrium effort level is higher in the tournament than under the piece-rate 
scheme but the expected utility of both compensation schemes is the same. Hence, risk-neutral 
subjects should be indifferent between the two schemes. For their part, risk averse subjects can 
adopt a less risky scheme by choosing the piece-rate scheme. We measure the subjects’ risk 
aversion by using the lottery procedure proposed by Holt and Laury  (2002). 
Our experiment delivers three main findings. First, the key novel finding is that the 
employees’ choice of pay schemes contributes to a considerable reduction in the variance of 
effort among contestants in the tournament. Second, the average effort is higher when the 
subjects can select their payment scheme, which suggests that the sorting effect reinforces the 
incentive effect of both tournaments and variable pay schemes. Third, the subjects self-select 
mainly according to their degree of risk aversion. A cluster analysis identifies a category of 
under-confident and hesitant subjects who tend to shy away from competition. The resulting 
greater homogeneity of contestants improves the overall efficiency of tournaments. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical 
framework and the experimental design. Section 3 gives the experimental procedures.  Section 
4 describes and analyzes the experimental evidence. Section 5 discusses the results and 
concludes.  
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2. Theory and Experimental Design 
2.1. The model 
Consider an economy with identical, risk-neutral agents. Agent i has the following utility 
function, separable in payment and in effort:  ( ) ( ) ( )i i i iU e u p c e= −    (1) 
with u(pi) concave and c(ei) convex. 
The production technology is stochastic and output is increasing in the agent’s effort:   ( )i iy f e iε= +                      (2)    
with f(ei) = ei for the sake of simplicity and εi is an i.i.d. random shock distributed over the 
interval [-z, +z]. Only individual outcomes are observable; individual effort is not observable, 
neither by the principal nor the other agents. The cost function is increasing and convex  
( ) 2ii ec e
s
=                                          (3)  
with s > 0, c(0) = 0, c’(ei) > 0 and c”(ei) > 0.
5
 
In the labor market, some firms pay the agents a piece-rate compensation scheme and other 
firms use tournaments. If there is a perfect mobility in the labor market at no cost, in the first 
stage the agents choose their firm (i.e. their payment scheme) and, in the second stage, they 
decide on their level of effort. Let us first solve the equilibrium effort levels under each mode 
of payment. 
In the piece-rate system, the agent’s payment depends only on his own outcome. The payment 
consists of a fixed wage, denoted by a, corresponding to an input-based payment and a linear 
                                                 
5 In this design, s is assumed to be similar for all agents, for the sake of simplicity. 
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piece-rate, denoted by b, corresponding to an output-based payment. Under this compensation 
scheme, the agent’s utility function becomes: 
2
( ) .PR ii i i
e
U e a b y
s
= + −                               (4)  
 The first order condition is: 
( )' 0PRi i
i
U
b c e
e
δδ = − =  
Thus, the equilibrium effort of each agent under the piece-rate payment scheme depends 
positively on  the incentive, b, as well as the cost scaling factor, s: 
* .
2
PR b se =                                  (5) 
In the firms practicing tournaments, the agents play a non-cooperative game with incomplete 
information like in Lazear and Rosen (1981). In pair-wise tournaments, two prizes are 
distributed: W is the winner’s prize allocated to the agent whose outcome is the highest and L 
is the loser’s prize, allocated to the other agent, with W > L. The magnitude of the difference 
between the two outcomes does not affect the determination of the winner of the tournament. 
The agent’s utility is: 
( ) ( )( ), i iTi i j i iW c e if y yU e e L c e if y y− >=  − <
( )
j
j
                  (6) 
The agents being symmetric, the probability to win the tournament, pr(ei,ej),  reduces to the 
probability that the difference in individual random terms exceeds the difference between 
individual effort levels: ( )i j j i,i jpr e e pr e eε ε= − > − . Agent i’s expected utility of the 
tournament is: 
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( ) ( ) ( ) 2, , .T ii i j i j eEU e e L pr e e W L
s
= + − −                                                                        (7) 
The maximization program yields the following first order condition: ( ) ( ) ( ), , 2 0Ti i j i j i
i i
EU e e pr e e e
W L
e e
δ δδ δ= − − s =                                                     (8)  
We obtain a pure symmetric Nash equilibrium, where effort increases with the prize spread 
and decreases with both the cost of effort and the size of the shock distribution: ( )* * .
4
T T
i j
W L s
e e
z
−= =                     (9)   
Having determined the equilibrium effort level under each payment scheme, we now turn to 
the first stage problem. The agent chooses his firm by comparing his expected utility under 
each payment scheme.  He is thus indifferent between the two schemes when: 
( ) 2 2
2
. .
4 . 2
0.5( )
2
W L s b s
z b s
W L a
s s
−        + − = + −                                                               (10) 
 
2.2. The experimental design 
The instructions have been kept as close as possible to Bull, Schotter and Weigelt (1987) (see 
Appendix). 
Two treatments. In the Benchmark Treatment, a single decision is made: the choice of the 
level of effort, knowing the cost function, the distribution of the random term and the 
compensation rule. An important difference from the set-up in Bull, Schotter and Weigelt 
(1987) is that in a session, half of the subjects are exogenously and randomly attributed a 
piece-rate payment scheme and the other half a tournament scheme. The proportion is 
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unknown to the subjects but they aware of the coexistence of two modes of payment. In 
contrast, Bull et al. (1987) organized separate sessions in which players were paid either a 
piece-rate or according to a tournament. We wish to keep the social environment comparable 
with that of the Choice Treatment in which both schemes coexist in the same session in 
unknown proportions.  The game is repeated 20 times. 
The Choice Treatment is similar to the Benchmark except that in the first stage of each period, 
the subjects choose to be paid according to either a piece-rate scheme or a tournament scheme. 
Those who have opted for the tournament are pooled together and paired. In case of an uneven 
number of contestants, one subject is randomly chosen and paid according to a piece-rate 
scheme; he is informed of this before deciding on his level of effort. There is no mobility cost, 
i.e. the subjects are free to move to the other payment scheme in each new period at no cost. 
The design of this game enables between-subject but not within-subject comparisons since 
each treatment is played by different subjects. The latter would have required submitting all 
the subjects to the exogenous piece-rate scheme, then to an exogenous tournament, then to the 
choice treatment. It would then have been necessary to alternate between the various 
treatments to control for potential order effects within the Benchmark and between the 
Benchmark and the Choice Treatments. Our design is simpler and allows the subjects to play 
more repetitions of a same treatment.
6
 
Matching protocol. Unlike most experiments on tournaments, here we adopt a stranger 
matching protocol. This is motivated by the constraint of the Choice treatment: if we had used 
a partner matching protocol, a subject who is willing to choose the tournament but who is 
                                                 
6 We took care of using similar pools of subjects in both treatments. The average age of the subjects is 20,9 years 
and the average safety index is 5.3 in both subgroups; Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests indicate that the distribution of 
age and safety index are not different between treatments.  The proportion of men is 45% in the Benchmark and 
47% in the Choice Treatment.  A Wilcoxon test accepts the equality between treatments. 
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paired with a person who always chooses the piece-rate, would be prevented from competing 
throughout the game. A drawback of our matching protocol is, however, that we reinforce the 
complexity of the tournament game due to conjectural variations, making it harder to make 
inferences about the opponent’s behavior. If errors in inferences were the source of the greater 
variability of effort in tournaments, this should entail a greater variability of effort in our 
design than in standard games. However,  this should not affect the comparison between 
treatments.
 7
 
Parameters. Effort can take any integer value in the set: { }0,1,...,100ie ∈ . In the cost 
function, s = 150, so that . The random shocks vary in the interval [-40,+40]. In 
the tournament, the winner’s prize has been set at W = 96 and the loser’s prize at L = 45. In the 
piece-rate scheme, the fixed wage, a, amounts to 45 and the piece-rate, b, is equal to .52, 
meaning that each unit of outcome gives .52 to the agent. These values ensure that the certain 
payment is the same under both schemes. Without such a fixed wage equal to the loser’s prize, 
it could be rational for a risk averse agent to choose the tournament and a minimum effort in 
order not to bear the consequences of a negative random shock on wages under a purely linear 
piece-rate scheme. Therefore, with our design, only the strategic uncertainty makes a 
difference between the two schemes. 
( ) 2 /150i ic e e=
Given these values, and assuming the agents to be risk neutral and rational, those who are paid 
according to a piece-rate scheme should provide the effort ei
PR*
 = 39, according to equation 
(5); those who enter the tournament should provide the effort ei
T*
 = 48, according to the pure 
strategy Nash equilibrium in equation (9). The players should be indifferent between the two 
                                                 
7 Bull, Schotter and Weigelt (1987) reject the errors in inference explanation of the variance: in fixed pairs, 
giving the subjects a feedback on the effort chosen by their opponent does not reduce the variance of effort. 
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payment schemes since the expected utility of both is the same (EUi
PR 
= EUi
T
 = 55), but if 
choosing the tournament they have to work harder.  
Elicitation of risk aversion. The above predictions hold for risk-neutral subjects. One would 
expect that risk averse subjects i) reduce their effort level under each mode of payment and ii) 
are more likely to stay out of the tournament to avoid the strategic uncertainty linked to the 
competition (Lazear and Rosen 1981). To elicit the risk aversion of our subjects, we used the 
lottery procedure proposed by Holt and Laury  (2002).  
At the end of the sessions (in order not to influence the game), the subjects filled out a 
questionnaire with 10 decisions (see the instructions in Appendix). Each decision consists of a 
choice between two paired lotteries, “option A” and “option B”. The payoffs for options A are 
either €2 or €1.6, whereas the riskier options B pay either €3.85 or €0.1. In the first decision, 
the probability of the high payoff for both options is 1/10. In the second decision the 
probability increases to 2/10. Similarly, the chances of receiving the high payoff for each 
decision increases as the number of the decision increases. When the probability of the high 
payoff is high enough, subjects should cross over from option A to option B. Risk neutrality 
corresponds to a shift at the fifth decision, while risk loving subjects are expected to move 
earlier and risk averse subjects as from the sixth decision. The subjects made 10 decisions but 
only one was selected at random for payment. 
3. Experimental Procedures  
The experiments have been conducted at the GATE laboratory, Lyon, France. The experiment 
was computerized, using the Regate software (Zeiliger 2000). We recruited 120 under-
graduate students from three business or engineering schools, trying to guarantee a fair gender 
distribution in each session (46% of male participants in total). Six sessions with 20 subjects in 
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each have been organized; 3 for the Benchmark Treatment and 3 for the Choice Treatment. 
Thanks to the 20 repetitions of the game, we collected a total of 2400 observations. 
Upon arrival, each subject was randomly assigned a computer. Instructions were distributed 
and read aloud. Attached to the instructions was a sheet displaying the decision costs 
associated with each possible effort from 0 to 100. Questions were answered in private. The 
participants had had to answer a series of questions about the computation of payoffs under 
each payment scheme. The experiment started once all the participants answered correctly.  
No communication was allowed.  
In the Benchmark Treatment, at the beginning of the session and for its whole duration 10 
subjects were attributed the piece-rate scheme and 10 the tournament scheme. In the Choice 
Treatment, in each period they had to tick either the “mode X” (piece-rate) box or the “mode 
Y” (tournament) box to choose their payment scheme for the current period. In both 
treatments, they selected their effort (“decision number”) by means of a scrollbar.  This being 
done, they had to click a button to generate their “personal random number” that was added to 
their effort choice to constitute their individual outcome (‘result”).  Under the tournament 
scheme, the computer program compared the outcomes of the two contestants in each pair and 
determined who was to receive the winner’s  prize (“the fixed payment M”) and who to get the 
loser’s prize (“the fixed payment L”). In case of a tie, a fair random draw determined the 
allocation of prizes among the pair members. At the end of the period, each subject received a 
feedback on his payoff and in case of a tournament, on the difference between his outcome 
and his competitor’s outcome. In each new period, the pairs involved in a tournament were 
randomly reconstituted. 
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After the completion of the 20 periods, the risk aversion post-experimental questionnaire was 
distributed and read aloud. Subjects noted on a sheet of paper the option they chose for each of 
the 10 lottery decisions. After all participants had made their decisions, each subject had to 
throw a ten-sided die twice: once to select the decision to be considered and a second time to 
determine her payoff for the option chosen, A or B.  
All the transactions, except the lottery, were conducted in points, with conversion into Euros 
at a rate of 80 points = €1. Payment consisted of the sum of payoffs during each period plus 
the lottery payment and a €3 show-up fee. On average, the subjects earned €17.4. The sessions 
lasted approximately one hour, excluding the lottery draw and payment that was made in 
private in a separate room for confidentiality. 
4. Experimental Results 
4.1. Mean and Variance of Effort 
Table 1 displays summary statistics about the mean and the distribution of effort by payment 
scheme and by treatment. 
First, we check whether we observe in our Benchmark treatment, like in the previous 
experiments, both a higher mean and a greater variance of effort under the tournament than 
under the piece-rate pay scheme. In this treatment, the average effort is 46.5 under the piece-
rate scheme and 53.3 in the tournaments. Both numbers are significantly above the 
equilibrium effort levels (39 and 48, respectively; t-test, p=0.000). As predicted, the agents 
exert more effort in a competitive setting (Mann-Whitney U test, p=0.000). As regards the 
variance of effort, our results corroborate those of previous experiments. Averaging over all 
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the periods, the total variance is 369 under the piece-rate scheme and 652 in tournaments. 
Thus the variability of effort is clearly higher under the competitive scheme. 
Table 1. Summary statistics on average level and variance of effort 
 
 Average effort Mean variance of effort 
Periods All 1 1-10 11-20 All 1 1-10 11-20 
Piece-rate  
  Benchmark Tr. 
  Choice Tr. 
46.5 
50.5 
55.7 
47.6 
48.9 
51.3 
44.0 
49.7 
  368.9 
  227.9 
388.1 
192.4 
380.3 
221.9 
354.8 
231.7 
Tournament         
  Benchmark Tr. 
  Choice Tr. 
53.3 
61.6 
60.0 
65.8 
55.6 
63.4 
50.9 
59.8 
  652.3 
  258.2 
663.8 
319.4 
674.4 
238.4 
633.5 
259.7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
30
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
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Piece-Rate - Benchmark
Tournament - Benchmark
e*PR
e*Tour
Piece-Rate - Choice T
Tournament - ChoiceT
Fig.1. Evolution of the effort decisions by treatment and by mode of payment over time 
Next, we turn to consider the influence of the possibility given to the subjects to choose their 
payment scheme. Table 1 and Figure 1 reveal a substantial increase of the average effort from 
53.3 in the Benchmark Treatment to 61.6 in the Choice Treatment. Interestingly, average 
effort also increases from 46.5 in the Benchmark to 50.4 for the agents who choose to be paid 
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a piece-rate. As a consequence, the differences relative to the equilibrium effort values are 
even larger when agents self-select. As for the tournaments, we note that while the subjects on 
average play the equilibrium effort in the last four periods in the Benchmark Treatment, this 
behavior cannot be observed in the Choice Treatment although there is a slight decline in 
effort over time. The choice of the payment scheme is associated with a slower convergence to  
equilibrium. 
Table 1 and Figure 2 also show a dramatic change in the variability of effort when agents self-
select. Comparing the Benchmark with the Choice Treatment, we find that the variance under 
the piece-rate diminishes from 368.9 to 227.9 (-38.2%) and the variance in the tournament 
decreases from 652.3 to 258.2 (-60.4%).  Not only is  the variability of effort lower when 
agents self-select, but now the tournament cannot be considered as more unstable than the 
piece-rate. Levene’s robust test statistic rejects the hypothesis of equality of variance between 
the tournament and the piece-rate in the Benchmark Treatment (z=48.93, p<0.000) but accepts 
it in the Choice Treatment (z=.135). 
 
 
0
2
0
4
0
6
0
8
0
1
0
0
1-5 6-10 11-15 16-20
Benchmark Treatment
0
2
0
4
0
6
0
8
0
1
0
0
1-5 6-10 11-15 16-20
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Fig.2. Dispersion of effort in the tournaments by treatment and category of periods 
Figure 2 displays the dispersion of effort in tournaments in each treatment. The distribution of 
effort in tournaments in the Choice Treatment is characterized by the following. The median 
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(indicated by the horizontal line) is slightly higher than in the benchmark. The distribution of 
effort (given by the quartiles, the grey bars) is more concentrated around the median when 
agents can self-select, whereas effort is more dispersed below the median when they cannot. 
The adjacent values (the vertical lines) are closer to the median, meaning in particular that 
contestants chose a zero effort less often (7 observations out of 564) than in the Benchmark 
Treatment (45 observations out of 600). 
The variability of effort across the game may be explained by both a time-varying  behavior 
(learning dimension) and time-invariant inter-individual characteristics (heterogeneity 
dimension). To gauge the relative importance of these two dimensions, in Table 2 we 
decompose the variance into its within and between components.   
Table 2. Decomposition of the variance of effort 
Variance Between-subject Within-subject Total 
Benchmark Treatment 
Piece-rate 
Tournament 
 
193.7 (52.5) 
       434.6 (66.6) 
 
175.2 (47.5) 
      217.7 (33.4) 
 
368.9 (100) 
       652.3 (100) 
Choice Treatment 
Piece-rate 
Tournament 
 
       120.0 (52.7) 
       101.8 (39.4) 
 
      107.9 (47.3) 
      156.4 (60.6) 
 
       227.9 (100) 
       258.2 (100) 
Note: Percentages of the total variance in parentheses. 
 
The between-subject variance of effort in tournaments accounts for two thirds of the total 
variance in the Benchmark Treatment. It is four times lower and it accounts for less than 40% 
of the total variance in the Choice Treatment.
8
 Consequently, when people self-select, the 
population of voluntary contestants is more homogeneous in terms of exerted effort and the 
                                                 
8 If we remove the observations with a level of effort of 0 or 100 (73 and 41, respectively), the between-subject 
variance in the tournament still represents 64% (270.6/419.9) of the total variance in the Benchmark and  42% 
(75.1/181.0) in the Choice Treatment. Thus the structure of the variance remains the same as when all the 
contestants are considered. 
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variability of effort is mainly due to an intra-individual component. The within-subject 
variance of effort in tournaments shows that in the Choice Treatment, the variability of effort 
is lower than in the Benchmark: the subjects learn less or they are less hesitant. Similar 
differences in the between-subject and within-subject variances are observed for the piece-rate 
scheme: both are lower when subjects can self-select. 
The descriptive statistics shown above refer to averages. Next, we account for individual 
characteristics. In Table 3, regressions (1) and (2) give the results of OLS regressions of the 
effort decisions in each treatment, with robust standard errors and accounting for clustering of 
the individuals; regressions (3) and (4) use panel data analysis with fixed effects. Explanatory 
variables include a time trend to capture learning, the mode of payment to capture the impact 
of competition, the random shock in the previous period and a series of individual 
characteristics such as gender, age, experience of experiments, and the degree of risk aversion. 
The risk aversion variable (coded from 1 to 10) corresponds to the number of the decision 
where the subject crosses over from the safer to the riskier option in the lottery test: the higher 
this number, the more risk averse the subject. 
 The main differences between the two treatments are related to the influence of the mode of 
payment and of risk aversion. In the Benchmark Treatment, the subjects do not exert a 
significantly higher effort in tournaments than under a piece-rate scheme. In contrast, 
competition stimulates performance when the subjects self-select, possibly because they 
consider that being volunteers, their opponents are also willing to compete hard. Risk aversion 
has a significant negative impact on effort when the payment schemes are imposed on the 
subjects: considering the uncertainty of the environment, risk-averse subjects reduce their cost. 
This variable is not significant in the Choice Treatment, suggesting that risk aversion plays a 
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role in the sorting process, but not once the choice has been made. The reverse is true for 
gender. In both treatments effort declines over time but this tendency is less pronounced when 
the subjects are allowed to choose their scheme. Although the periods are independent, the 
subjects in both treatments adjust their effort downwards (upwards) when they have got a 
positive (negative) random shock in the previous period. 
Table 3. Determinants of the effort decision 
 
                     Regressions with robust  
standard errors 
    Panel data analysis  
    with fixed effects  
Treatments Benchmark (1) Choice (2)   Benchmark (3) Choice (4) 
Periods 
 
Tournament 
 
Lagged random shock 
 
Risk aversion 
 
Male subject 
 
Age 
 
Experience 
 
-.4888*** 
(.1342) 
5.1846 
(4.7936) 
-.0743*** 
(.0252) 
-2.4814** 
(1.1169) 
-5.4184 
(4.8132) 
-3.1068 
(1.8634) 
4.0601 
(8.0158) 
-.3049*** 
(.0953) 
10.3899*** 
(1.4860) 
-.0399** 
(.0166) 
-0.1011 
(.8539) 
-6.5433*** 
(2.2455) 
.3910 
(0.4398) 
-.3474 
(2.9161) 
     -.4822*** 
   (.0728) 
- 
 
   -.0393** 
   (.0171) 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
       
-.2958*** 
(.0689) 
11.8411*** 
(.8753) 
-.0294* 
(.0162) 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
Nb obs. 
Prob>F 
R2 
1140 
0.000 
0.1088 
1140 
0.000 
0.1630 
   1140 
 0.000 
   0.0167 
1140 
        0.000 
0.1198 
Note:  Standard errors in parentheses; *** significant at 1% level, ** at 5% level, * at the 10% level. 
     
The third and fourth columns of Table 3 display the estimations accounting for the 
longitudinal character of the data and including individual fixed effects. We may note that the 
coefficients to the lagged random shock are reduced but continue to differ from zero, whereas 
the other coefficients do not change much. In particular, it is worth remarking that the estimate 
to the tournament dummy in the choice treatment is larger, not smaller, when fixed effects are 
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entered. This is interesting because the fixed effects, in addition to the individual 
characteristics included in columns 1 and 2, are also picking up the impact of time-invariant 
unobservables. 
Behavior in the Choice Treatment clearly differs from behavior in the Benchmark Treatment. 
It is therefore important to understand what determines sorting. 
4.2. Sorting 
In the Choice Treatment, the competitive scheme is chosen in 50% of the cases. Its relative 
frequency declines slightly from 52.7% in the first ten periods to 47.3% in the subsequent ten 
periods. This corresponds to the theoretical prediction since the expected utility in the 
tournament and the piece-rate scheme is the same. Does it mean that subjects choose at 
random or can we identify subjects’ characteristics that predict their behavior?  
A first candidate for a determinant of sorting is risk aversion. Table 4 compares the 
distribution of our subjects in terms of risk attitude to the results in Holt and Laury (2002).  
Table 4. Distribution of risk attitudes 
 
Our experiment Number of  
safe choices 
Holt and Laury’s 
classification 
Holt and 
Laury’s 
experiment Benchmark T. Choice T. 
0-1 Highly Risk Lover 0.01 0.05 0.00 
2 Very Risk Lover 0.01 0.00 0.02 
3 Risk Lover 0.06 0.05 0.10 
4 Risk Neutral 0.26 0.18 0.22 
5 Slightly Risk Averse 0.26 0.18 0.15 
6 Risk Averse 0.23 0.32 0.30 
7 Very Risk Averse 0.13 0.17 0.17 
8 Highly Risk Averse 0.03 0.03 0.03 
9-10 Stay in Bed 0.01 0.02 0.02 
 
Note: The number of safe choices corresponds to the number of the decisions with the “safe” option A, and thus 
corresponds to the “risk aversion” variable in our econometric analysis. 
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We observe higher proportions of risk lovers and more than slightly risk averse subjects than 
in Holt and Laury’s pool of subjects, but the differences are small. A Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
exact test does not reject the hypothesis of equality of distribution functions between our 
Benchmark and Choice Treatments. 
Figure 3 relates the frequency of our subjects’ tournament choices to their proportion of safe 
choices in the ten decisions of the lottery task. Contestants have been grouped into three 
categories: subjects who choose the tournament in at least 14 periods out of 20 (“tournament 
+”), subjects who choose the tournament in 6 periods or less (“tournament -“), and an 
intermediate category (“tournament =”). The dashed line corresponds to the behavior of a risk 
neutral agent switching from option A to option B at decision 5.  
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Fig.3. Proportion of safe lottery choices and frequency of the tournament choices 
 
Clearly, the subjects who choose the tournament less frequently are more risk averse than the 
other categories.
9
 All risk-averse subjects considered together (who made at least 5 safe lottery 
                                                 
9 We checked that although made at the end of the sessions, the lottery decisions do not result from the behavior 
in the main game instead of explaining it.  In fact, there is no correlation between the number of safe choices in 
the lotteries and the individual’s net payoff.  
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choices) choose the tournament in 45% of the periods, whereas the corresponding proportions 
are 60% for the risk neutral subjects and 56% for the risk lovers. A Poisson count model of the 
total number of tournaments chosen by the subject throughout the session has been estimated, 
including individual characteristics. It shows that only risk aversion exerts a significant 
influence and its marginal effect is important: crossing over from the safer to the riskier option 
one decision later in the lottery choices reduces by 77.8% the number of tournament choices.  
We have also conducted an econometric analysis of the choice of the tournament scheme, the 
results of which are reported in Table 5. Regression (1) estimates a panel probit model with 
random effects, and regression (2) a panel logit model with fixed effects.
10
 
Table 5. Determinants of the tournament choice 
 
 Panel Probit model, 
with random effects (1) 
Panel Logit model  
with fixed effects (2) 
Periods 
 
Lagged random shock 
 
Risk aversion 
 
Male subject 
 
Age 
 
Experience 
 
Constant 
-.0173** 
(.0074) 
-.0030* 
(.0017) 
-.1461** 
(.0745) 
-.0227 
(.2176) 
-.0349 
(.0355) 
-.0923 
(.2564) 
1.7981** 
(.8511) 
-.0295** 
(.0125) 
-.0051* 
(.0029) 
 
 
Nb observations 
Wald χ2 / LR  χ2 
Prob>χ2 
Log Likelihood 
1140 
14.61 
0.023 
-691.00 
1102 
8.60 
0.014 
-517.07 
Note: standard errors in parentheses; ** significant at 5% level, * at 10% level.  
                                                 
10 We also tested a selection model with random effects, including the treatment variable in the non-selection 
equation, fitted by simulated maximum likelihood. The selection equation included risk aversion, demographic 
variables and lagged random shock.  The results are consistent with Table 3 and 4, except that gender looses its 
significance.  However, the robustness of this selection model is not big because of the small number of 
variables, especially time-varying ones. 
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 This analysis confirms that the degree of risk aversion is an important determinant of the 
choice of the competitive scheme, whereas demographic characteristics exert no effect.  
The tournament choice is also affected by previous outcomes. The regression shows that it 
declines over time and that bad luck in the previous period increases the probability to enter 
the competition. This may reflect the subjects’ attempts to get the winner’s prize to 
compensate for small earnings in the previous period. Lastly, descriptive statistics indicate that 
if 70% of those who won a tournament in the previous period choose to remain in the 
competitive scheme, this percentage decreases to 55% among those who lost the previous 
competition. 
Overall, these results suggest that risk aversion may be an important determinant of 
occupational choices. They are consistent with the survey analysis by Bonin et al. (2006) 
carried out on German data, which shows that risk averse employees tend to concentrate in 
jobs with low earnings risks. 
4.3 Heterogeneity of Behavior in Tournaments 
To investigate the behavioral origins of the reduction of effort variability when individuals 
self-select into tournaments, we adopt a cluster analysis that helps in identifying different 
types of behavior. In order to partition the sample, we retain three variables that summarize 
each individual’s decisions: her frequency of tournament choices, her mean effort in the 
tournament and its standard deviation. In the Benchmark treatment, we only consider the last 
two variables. We apply the hierarchical Wald method based on the minimization of the intra-
group variance to identify the clusters that sum up the strategies.  Clusters have been grouped 
so that each one includes at least 10% of the subjects.   
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In both treatments, four main categories of tournament players are identified displaying 
similar characteristics; therefore we use the same denomination of clusters. The so-called 
“underconfident competitors” are subjects who exert an excessively high level of effort (more 
than 50% above the equilibrium), with relatively low standard deviation.  The “motivated 
competitors” are subjects who exert a level of effort still higher than the equilibrium but closer 
to it.  The “hesitant competitors” group consists of subjects who alternate levels of effort 
below and above the equilibrium and are characterized by the highest standard deviation of 
effort. Lastly, “economizing competitors” are subjects who follow a stable strategy based on 
the choice of a level of effort below the equilibrium. 
Table 6 summarizes the statistics that characterize these behaviors in each treatment. The first 
column indicates the proportion of each cluster in the population. The second column 
represents the relative frequency with which the tournament has been played during the 
session. The following columns give the mean individual effort and within-individual standard 
deviation of effort in the tournament. The last column gives the between-subject standard 
deviation within each cluster. 
Table 6.  Behavior in tournaments  
 
 Share in the 
population 
Relative 
frequency 
Mean effort Within-
subjects SD 
Between-
subjects SD 
Benchmark Treatment  
Underconfident Competitors 30.0 100 74.5 6.3 4.2 
Motivated Competitors 30.0 100 59.9 10.8 5.4 
Hesitant Competitors 30.0 100 40.6 20.5 7.1 
Economizing Competitors 10.0 100 7.6 9.9 7.1 
      
Choice Treatment      
Frequent competitors 
Motivated Competitors 40.0 57.9 61.9 9.4 3.7 
Economizing Competitors 18.3 50.9 44.6 7.6         15.6 
Occasional competitors 
Hesitant Competitors 10.0 35.8 53.1 32.6 6.5 
Underconfident Competitors 31.7 34.4 73.2 10.7 6.3 
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 In the Choice Treatment, the analysis identifies two main categories of subjects according to 
their frequency of tournament choice. Frequent competitors, who compete in at least half of 
the periods, are characterized by a lower within-subject variance of effort than the occasional 
competitors, who choose the tournament in about one third of the periods. 
When they can select their payment scheme, the individuals who enter more frequently into 
the tournament are both the motivated and the economizing competitors. The group of 
motivated competitors is very homogenous as indicated by the low between-subject deviation. 
The relative importance of this group (40% of all the subjects involved in this treatment) 
contributes to explain the lower variance of effort in tournaments when individuals can self-
select. In contrast, the group of economizing competitors shows the lowest within-subject and 
the highest between-subject variance of effort. It includes subjects who choose a minimum 
cost but can expect to win the tournament by chance. It also includes subjects who exert a 
level of effort slightly below equilibrium, possibly due to overconfidence or perception biases 
with respect to uncertainty, such as misconceptions of chance (Kahneman, Slovic, and 
Tversky 1982) or illusion of control over external events originated in being given a choice 
(Langer 1975).
11
 Whatever the explanation, their low-cost choices enable them to earn more 
on average than the motivated competitors (45.8 and 42.7, respectively). 
The hesitant and the under-confident subjects are occasional competitors. The high within-
subject variance of effort of the first group suggests that, facing the strategic uncertainty 
                                                 
11 In the first period of the game, after the subjects have chosen their level of effort, we asked them: « How big do 
you estimate your chances are that you will draw a random number that increases your payoff ? ». 14% reported 
a probability lower than .49 and 13% a probability exceeding .50. 61% of the optimistic subjects opted for the 
tournament, whereas the corresponding percentages are 47% for the pessimistic and 48% for the well-calibrated 
subjects. According to a probit regression (not shown) including only the first period data and individual 
observable characteristics, optimism marginally but significantly (at the 10% level) increases tournament entry.  
If all periods are considered, miscalibration is no longer significant since subjective beliefs are revised throughout 
the game. 
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attached to the tournament, these subjects make errors both above and below the equilibrium. 
Entering the tournament less often reinforces the difficulties of learning the equilibrium. 
Consequently, they earn less on average in the tournament than the frequent competitors (40.8 
points). The group of under-confident competitors is also not able to compute the equilibrium 
but always exerts a very high level of average effort in tournaments (73.2, i.e. 52.5% above 
the equilibrium). As a consequence, even if they win relatively often the competition, the cost 
of effort is too high and thus they earn considerably less on average than under the piece-rate 
scheme (36 and 50.6 points, respectively). 
The comparison between treatments indicates that the reduction of the effort variability in 
tournaments when agents can self-select is due to the fact that the most extreme categories in 
terms of average effort and the most unstable agents tend to stay out of the competition.  The 
experiment points to a potential limitation of sorting. The motivated competitors provide an 
over-supply of effort and their net earnings are not very high. These subjects do not enter into 
a rat race (effort does not increase over time), but nevertheless, sorting reinforces a tendency 
to exert excess effort from some employees. 
5. Discussion and Conclusion 
In a one-shot game environment, our results confirm that both the average level and the 
variance of effort are higher under a tournament than under a piece-rate payment scheme. This 
higher variability of effort has long been considered an important disadvantage since the 
employers have to bear uncertainty as to how the agents behave in relative performance 
compensation schemes. However, by analyzing an experimental setting which accounts for a 
key feature of markets, that the agents can choose their payment scheme, our results paint a 
fundamentally different picture. A major finding of this paper is that when the subjects enter 
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the tournament voluntarily, the average effort is higher and the variance of effort is 
substantially lower compared to situations in which the same payment scheme is imposed.  
In our experiment, average effort in the freely chosen tournament is 32.5% higher than in the 
exogenously imposed piece-rate scheme. This differential can be decomposed into an 
incentive and a sorting effect. The difference between effort levels in the imposed piece-rate 
and in the imposed tournament is an estimate of the incentive effect of tournaments: here, this 
is of the magnitude of a 14.6% increase in effort. The difference of 17.9% between the total 
increase in effort and the estimated incentive effect can be attributed to the sorting effect of 
tournaments. The sorting effect makes up a little more than half of the total increase in effort; 
this is comparable to Lazear’s (2000) corresponding estimates in connection with the switch 
from a fixed pay to a variable pay scheme. This confirms the importance of taking sorting into 
account when evaluating the efficiency of compensation schemes.  
Another important and new result is that sorting significantly decreases the variance of effort 
in tournaments. When agents freely enter the tournament, the between-subject variance is four 
times smaller than when this scheme is imposed and it is even lower than the variance of effort 
under the piece-rate scheme. It is worth noting that we obtain this result in spite of the 
increased complexity of the task to be performed as compared with previous studies. 
Consequently, our experiment does not lead to the same recommendations as Bull, Weigelt 
and Schotter (1987), who suggest that to attract contestants, an employer should offer them a 
higher expected utility than under a piece-rate scheme. Our conclusion is rather that labor 
market flexibility, in particular the absence of restrictions on mobility between firms, is a key 
condition for a higher efficiency of relative performance pay.  
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Our results indicate that the efficiency-enhancing effect of sorting derives from the resulting 
greater homogeneity of contestants. Since tournaments involve higher uncertainty than the 
piece-rate scheme, risk averse subjects choose them to a lesser extent. Under-confident 
subjects also prefer the piece-rate scheme since they exert too much effort in the tournament, 
entailing an excessive cost of effort. Hesitant subjects, alternating between above and below 
equilibrium effort levels, are not attracted by the tournament either. On the other hand, 
individuals who are motivated to work hard do not hesitate to choose the tournament in which 
equilibrium effort is higher. Among frequent contestants, the motivated competitors represent 
the biggest and the most stable category. Thus, the homogeneity of the contestants is higher 
when the tournament is chosen and this contributes to the lower variance of effort. More 
homogeneity does not, however, give rise to collusion. Beyond this, our results suggest that 
introducing more competitive payment schemes in some occupations would sort employees 
and that the attitude toward risk may be an important driver of mobility between firms or 
sectors. 
Having demonstrated that sorting has profound implications for the level and variance of 
effort in tournaments, we think further work should focus on how sorting is affected both by 
the prize structure and by differences in individuals’ skills and social preferences: if people 
care about the negative externalities imposed on others by their individual effort, they may try 
not only to reduce their level of effort in relative pay scheme (Bandiera, Barankay, and Rasul 
2005), but also to stay out of a competition. Our work suggests more generally the importance 
of reconsidering the influence of sorting in many economic decisions. 
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Appendix. Instructions of the Choice Treatment 
You are about to participate in an experiment on decision-making organized for the GATE research institute and 
the Aarhus School of Business in Denmark. During this session, you can earn money. The amount of your 
earnings depends on your decisions and on the decisions of the participants you will have interacted with. During 
the session, your earnings will be calculated in points,  
with 80 points = 1Euro 
During the session, losses are possible. However, they can be avoided with certainty by your decisions. In 
addition, if a loss would occur in a period, the gains realized during the other periods should compensate this loss. 
At the end of the session, all the profits you have made in each period will be added up and converted into Euros. 
In addition, you will receive a show-up fee of 3 Euros. You will have also an opportunity to earn additional 
money by participating in a decision task at the end of the session. Your earnings will be paid to you in cash in a 
separate room in order to preserve confidentiality. 
The session consists of 20 independent periods. 
___________ 
Description of each period 
Each period consists of two stages. 
 In stage 1, you choose between two modes of payment, mode X and mode Y. 
  In stage 2, you carry out a task. 
 
Your profit during each period depends on the mode of payment you have chosen and on your result from the 
task. 
 
Description of the task 
 
o A table is attached to these instructions: numbers, from 0 to 100, are given in column A. In the second stage 
of each period, your task consists of selecting one of these numbers. This number will be called your 
“decision number”. Associated with each number is a cost, called “decision cost”. These decision costs are 
listed in column B. Note that the higher the decision number chosen, the greater is the associated cost. You 
make your choice by means of a scrollbar on your computer screen and you confirm this choice by clicking 
the “OK” button.  
o Then, you have to click a button on your screen that will generate a random number. This number is called 
your “personal random draw number”. This number can take any value between – 40 and + 40. Each number 
between – 40 and + 40  is as likely to be drawn and there is one independent random draw between – 40 and 
+ 40 for  each subject in the lab. 
Your “result” for the task is the sum of your decision number and your personal random draw number.  
Your result = your decision number + your personal random draw number 
 
Choice of the mode of payment and calculation of your payoff  
There are two different modes of payment, mode X and mode Y. In the first stage of each period, you choose to 
be paid according to mode X or to mode Y. If you like, you can change the mode of payment at each new period. 
 Description of mode of payment X 
If you choose the mode of payment X, your result is multiplied by 0.52.  You also receive a fixed amount of 45 
points. Next, the decision cost associated to the choice of your decision number is subtracted. Note, the amount 
subtracted (your decision cost) is only a function of your decision number; that is, your personal random draw 
number does not affect the amount subtracted. 
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 Your payoff thus depends on your decision number and your personal random draw number. Your net payoff 
under mode X is thus given by the following formula: 
 
Your net payoff of the period under mode X = 
45 + (your result * 0.52) –  your decision cost 
At the end of the period, you are informed about your result and about your net payoff for the current period. 
 
Example of net payoff calculation under mode of payment X 
For example, say that you choose a decision number of 55 and you draw a personal random number of 10. Your 
net payoff calculation will look like: 
45 + [(55 + 10) * 0.52] – 20.17 = 58.63 
  Description of mode of payment Y 
If you choose the mode of payment Y, another subject in the room, who has also chosen the mode of payment Y, 
is paired with you at random for the current period. This subject is called your “pair member”. The identity of 
your pair member will never be revealed to you. 
Your pair member has an identical sheet as yours. Like you and simultaneously, he has to select a decision 
number and he will draw his personal random number. As for you, the “result” of your pair member is computed 
by adding his decision number and his personal random draw number. 
Then, the computer program will compare your result and the result of your pair member.  
- If your result is greater than your pair member’s result, you receive the fixed payment M, equal to 96 
points. 
- If your result is lower than your pair member’s result, you receive the fixed payment L, equal to 45 
points. 
- In case of equal results, a fair random move decides on which subject receives M and who receives L.  
Whether you receive M or L as your fixed payment depends only on whether your result is greater or not than 
your pair member’s. It does not depend on how much bigger it is. 
To determine your net payoff, the decision cost associated with the choice of your decision number is subtracted. 
Note, the amount subtracted is only a function of your decision number; that is, your personal random draw 
number does not affect the amount subtracted. 
Therefore, your net payoff depends on your decision number, your personal random draw number, and your pair 
member’s decision number and his personal random draw number. 
 
Your net payoff under mode Y is given by the following formula: 
Your net payoff of the period under mode of payment Y =  
 Fixed payment (M or L)  – your decision cost 
At the end of the period, you are informed about your result; you are told by how much your total is greater or 
less than that of your pair member and you are informed about your net payoff for the current period.  
Example of net  payoff calculation under mode of payment Y 
For example, say that pair member A chooses a decision number of 25 and draws a personal random number of  
20, while pair member B selects a decision number of 55 and draws a personal random number of -5.  
A’s result is: 25 + 20= 45 
B’s result is: 55  -  5= 50 
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B’s result is larger than A’s result. Thus, B receives M (=96) and A receives L (=45). 
A’s net payoff  is: 45 – 4.17 = 40.83 
B’s net payoff is: 96 – 20.17 = 75.83 
To sum up, in each period you make two decisions: 
 
- In stage 1, you choose between mode of payment X and mode of payment Y. Note that if an uneven 
number of participants has chosen mode Y, one of these participants will be randomly chosen and paid 
according to mode X. To be paid according to mode Y, pairs must be formed. This participant will be 
informed of this before moving to stage 2.  
 
- In stage 2, you select your decision number and you draw a personal random number. Your net payoffs 
for the current period are then computed. 
 
At the end of a period, a new period starts automatically. Each period is independent. The random draws are 
independent from one period to the next. In each period, under mode of payment Y, pairs are composed at 
random among the participants who have chosen this mode of payment.  
----------------- 
If you have any question regarding these instructions, please raise your hand. Your questions will be answered in 
private. Throughout the entire session, talking is not allowed. Any violation of this rule will result in being 
excluded from the session and not receiving payment. 
 
Thank you for your participation. 
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Decision Costs Table 
 
 
Column A 
Decision Nb 
Column B 
Cost of Decision 
Column A 
Decision Nb 
Column B 
Cost of Decision 
Column A 
Decision Nb 
Column B 
Cost of Decision 
0 0.00 35 8.17 70 32.67 
1 0.01 36 8.64 71 33.61 
2 0.03 37 9.13 72 34.56 
3 0.06 38 9.63 73 35.53 
4 0 .11 39 10.14 74 36.51 
5 0.17 40 10.67 75 37.50 
6 0.24 41 11.21 76 38.51 
7 0.33 42 11.76 77 39.53 
8 0.43 43 12.33 78 40.56 
9 0.54 44 12.91 79 41.61 
10 0.67 45 13.50 80 42.67 
11 0.81 46 14.11 81 43.74 
12 0.96 47 14.73 82 44.83 
13 1.13 48 15.36 83 45.93 
14 1.31 49 16.01 84 47.04 
15 1.50 50 16.67 85 48.17 
16 1.71 51 17.34 86 49.31 
17 1.93 52 18.03 87 50.46 
18 2.16 53 18.73 88 51.63 
19 2.41 54 19.44 89 52.81 
20 2.67 55 20.17 90 54.00 
21 2.94 56 20.91 91 55.21 
22 3.23 57 21.66 92 56.43 
23 3.53 58 22.43 93 57.66 
24 3.84 59 23.21 94 58.91 
25 4.17 60 24.00 95 60.17 
26 4.51 61 24.81 96 61.44 
27 4.86 62 25.63 97 62.73 
28 5.23 63 26.46 98 64.03 
29 5.61 64 27.31 99 65.34 
30 6.00 65 28.17 100 66,67 
31 6.41 66 29.04   
32 6.83 67 29.93   
33 7.26 68 30.83   
34 7.71 69 31.74   
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Post experimental questionnaire  
[Instructions for the test of risk aversion directly taken from Holt and Laury, 2002 ] 
 
We thank you for filling out this form that enables you to earn additional money. The attached sheet of paper 
shows ten decisions. Each decision is a paired choice between “Option A” and “Option B”. You will make ten 
choices and record these in the column on the right, but only one of them will be used in the end to determine 
your additional earnings. Let us explain how these choices will affect your earnings. 
Here is a ten-sided die that will be used to determine this payoff. The faces are numbered from 1 to 10 (the “0” 
face of the die will serve as 10). After you have made all of your choices, and when you come to the other office 
to receive your payment, you will throw this die twice:  
- once to select one of the ten decisions to be used,  
- and a second time to determine what your payoff is for the option you chose, A or B, for the particular 
decision selected.  
 
Even though we ask you to make ten decisions, only one of these will end up affecting your earnings. However, 
you will not know in advance which decision will be used. Obviously, each decision has an equal chance of being 
used in the end. 
 • Look at Decision 1.  
Option A pays 2 € if the throw of the dice is 1, and it pays 1.6 € if the throw is 2-10.  
Option B yields 3.85 € if the throw of the dice is 1 and it pays 0.1 € if the throw is 2-10.   
 • Look at Decision 2.  
Option A pays 2 € if the throw of the dice is 1 or 2, and it pays 1.6 € if the throw is 3-10.  
Option B yields 3.85 € if the throw of the dice is 1 or 2 and it pays 0.1 € if the throw is 3-10.   
 
The other decisions are similar, except that as you move down the table, the chances of a higher payoff for each 
option increase.  In fact, for Decision 10 in the bottom row, the dice will not be needed since each option pays the 
highest  payoff for sure, so your choice here is between 2 € and 3.85 €. 
 
To summarize, 
- you will make ten choices. For each decision row, you will have to choose between Option A and 
Option B. You may choose A for some decision rows and B for other rows. You may change your 
decisions and make them in any order.  
 
- When you come to the other room to receive your earnings from the experiment, you will throw the ten-
sided die to select which of the ten decisions will be used.  
 
- Then, you will throw the die again to determine your money earnings for the Option you chose for that 
Decision.  
 
Earnings (in Euros) for this choice will be added to your previous earnings, and you will be paid all earnings in 
cash. 
If you have any question, please raise your hand. Your questions will be answered in private. Please do not talk 
with anyone. 
 
--------------- 
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Please indicate for each of the following 10 decisions if you choose Option A or Option B.  
 
 Your decision 
Decision 1 
Option A: 1/10 of 2 € and 9/10 of 1.6 € 
Option B: 1/10  of 3.85 € and 9/10 of 0.1 € 
 
Option A      O        
Option B      O 
Decision 2 
Option A: 2/10 of 2 € and 8/10 of 1.6 € 
Option B: 2/10  of 3.85 € and 8/10 of 0.1 € 
 
Option A     O         
Option B     O 
Decision 3 
Option A: 3/10 of 2 € and 7/10 of 1.6 € 
Option B: 3/10  of 3.85 € and 7/10 of 0.1 € 
 
Option A     O         
Option B     O 
Decision  4 
Option A: 4/10 of 2 € and 6/10 of 1.6 € 
Option B: 4/10  of 3.85 € and 6/10 of 0.1 € 
 
Option A     O         
Option B     O 
Decision 5 
Option A: 5/10 of 2 € and 5/10 of 1.6 € 
Option B: 5/10  of 3.85 € and 5/10 of 0.1 € 
 
Option A     O         
Option B     O 
Decision 6 
Option A: 6/10 of 2 € and 4/10 of 1.6 € 
Option B: 6/10  of 3.85 € and 4/10 of 0.1 € 
 
Option A     O         
Option B     O 
Decision  7 
Option A: 7/10 of 2 € and 3/10 of 1.6 € 
Option B: 7/10  of 3.85 € and 3/10 of 0.1 € 
 
Option A     O         
Option B     O 
Decision 8 
Option A: 8/10 of 2 € and 2/10 of 1.6 € 
Option B: 8/10  of 3.85 € and 2/10 of 0.1 € 
 
Option A     O         
Option B     O 
Decision  9 
Option A: 9/10 of 2 € and 1/10 of 1.6 € 
Option B: 9/10  of 3.85 € and 1/10 of 0.1 € 
 
Option A     O         
Option B     O 
Decision 10 
Option A: 10/10 of 2 € and 0/10 of 1.6 € 
Option B: 10/10  of 3.85 € and 0/10 of 0.1 € 
 
Option A     O         
Option B     O 
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